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As concern for care for the dying increases, including hospice care,
it is important to examine some of the ethical considerations included
in this concern and its implementation. There are three areas of consideration - first, ethical obligations which stem from the profession
of medicine toward the dying; second, ethical problems which arise in
attempting to secure those obligations toward individual patients;
third, ethical features of providing social policy for the care of the
dying, particularly the development of adequate hospice programs. I
will briefly examine each of these.
Ethical Obligations Toward the Dying

I,

\

Insofar as we are all members of society, all of us participate in
general obligations of justice toward those in need. 1 In addition, those
professing religious compassion have the urgings of charity which
emphasize the obligations of justice. However, health professionals
have additional ethical obligations to care for the living and the dying
which stem from their profession to heal. 2
Healing is a value which infuses the health care/patient relationship.
The health care professional commits himself to this value by acting
on behalf of the patient, not with respect to all the values of the
patient, but with respect to health. The patient commits himself to
this care, to the many indignities and passivities of the relationship,
because he or she also values health and healing.
Among the obligations which arise from this relationship to patients
for the health professional are the following: 1) do no harm; 2)
respect the vulnerability of the patient; 3) treat each patient as a class
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instance of the human race, without attention to his or her economic,
social and political standing. 3
It is important to remember that the patient's need for the skills of
the health professional with respect to healing is the very lifeblood of
the relationship. As the patient's need increases, so too does the intensity of the three ethical obligations cited above. 4 Thus one might
consider turning away a destitute patient with a minor cut on the
finger, but health professionals must treat dying patients (obligation
no. 3 ).
The major ethical consideration in this category, therefore, stems
both from the dying patient's need for the skills health professionals
can provide and for the shifting notion of healing operative in the
relationship. With major diseases such as cancer and heart trouble it is
never absolutely clear that a crisis will lead to death at this time.
Although health professionals continue to respond to the needs of
their patients in terms of "making them comfortable" or otherwise
offering palliative measures such as new chemotherapeutic combinations or pain suppression operations, the operative notion of healing
has switched from possible cure of the disease to providing several
good months.
However, what the patient may now need is a broader conception
of healing than cure, palliative measures, or pain-killing drugs.
Although these should not be ruled out, the ethical obligation to heal
now requires the health professional to ask some disturbing questions.
Am I now, at this point in disease progression, merely prolonging life
needlessly, adding to the pain and agony of the patient and family?
What is the healing thing to do at this point? If I do not exercise some
of my skills, am I abandoning the patient?
Most ethicists would agree with Paul Ramsey's view that the obligation to heal, in the case of the dying patient, does not mean to
needlessly prolong life. Instead the obligation now turns, as the
patient clearly deteriorates, to providing a decent death. 5 This provision leads to the second class of ethical considerations.
Ethical Considerations for Individual Patients
I discussed above a health professional's general obligations toward
dying patients. The real ethical problems occur, however, in trying to
carry out these obligations for individual patients. If the obligation to
heal no longer means to employ the general medical armamentarium
useful for combating disease, what specific measures should be
selected, withheld, and discontinued? Of course this is not only a
medical question but also an ethical one because it is asked in the
context of obligations toward the patient.
Each case varies. But the common ethical problems involving dying
patients include selecting extraordinary means to preserve life, 6
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withholding some measures including those normally considered
ordinary means, and discontinuing both ordinary and extraordinary
measures. Let us look at these three actions in reverse order.
Physicians are less apt to discontinue a measure once begun than
not to order it. This reluctance stems from the engagement with the
patient created by these measures and their identification with providing for the patient's needs. In light of the above discussion on
healing, however, neither ordinary nor extraordinary means need to be
continued to carry out one's obligations when a dying patient or
family member requests discontinuance. Not only respirators and
other "heroic" measures, but also IV's and antibiotics fall under this
consideration.
Withholding extraordinary means can depend on patient or family
requests, living wills, or a no-code contract with the patient. 7 Withholding ordinary means, such as IV fluids, antibiotics, or even the
respirator if it is being used to adjust drug dosages for seizures and the
like, is far more problematic. The same holds true for selecting some
measures rather than others. The patient and family may not be the
best judges of the current stage of the disease. These judgments will
depend on the history of the disease, therapies already tried and
failed, patient values about the true nature of healing, and the doctor's
judgment.
Thus, if a patient has agreed to work for "some good months," and
clinical indicators do not reveal whether a current crisis may be the
last, the doctor should select everything available at his command,
mindful of the difficulty of discontinuing therapy once the crisis is
revealed as terminal. If the patient has opted for quitting, a severe
injustice is done to order extraordinary measures, though ordinary
means are still required until the crisis is judged not only irreversible,
but terminal. If a patient has explicitly asked to be allowed to die,
especially after a year or two of frequent hospitalizations, remissions
and relapses, this wish must be taken seriously even though the doctor
may think he could prolong the patient's life a few more months.
Given the emphasis on cure in medical training and the technological capacity of modem medicine, withholding therapy seems inconsistent with the goals of health care. However, serious reflection on
the needs of the patient who is dying and the nature of the healing
obligation can offer some moral guidelines to those who care for dying
patients.
Ethical Basis of Hospice
The hospice, whether home health care-based or hospital-based or
both, rests on the same fundamental moral principle as does the
doctor-patient relationship and should be viewed as an extension of
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the relationship. Thus, it is based on patient need for healing and, at
least partially, on health care obligation to provide that healing. By
definition one is not referred to hospice care unless he or she is suffering an irreversible tenninal disease in its end stages. No more than six
months of further life are anticipated.s
Hospice care should not be viewed as an alternative to health care,
but rather, as a supplement. If it is construed in the former fashion,
the prior bond between doctor and patient is ruptured. Referral to
hospice would appear in the doctor's mind as abandoning a long-term
patient rather than as supplementing the medical needs of the patient
with other needs modern medicine cannot provide. Among these
needs are a family environment (at home or in specially designed care
institutions), legal, spiritual, economic and social support. Of course,
these are major needs. However, they, too, fall under the rubric of
healing that infuses the health care/patient relationship as well. If
viewed in this way, hospice care is an extension of health care and
shares its moral basis. The patient still needs the palliative measures
medicine can provide and will need extensive individual attention for
problems of pain, mobility, anxiety, and bed care. Being under
hospice care will diminish the two fears patients have about dying - a
fear of abandonment and a fear of sudden catastrophe. 9
With respect to physician obligations toward the patient discussed
in the first two sections, hospice referral can resolve many of the
ethical dilemmas faced when caring for dying patients in traditional
environments. One has been mentioned already. Such referral does
not mean abandoning the patient or bouncing .him back to a nursing
home to be seen again in the emergency room when another crisis
develops. The physician still manages the patient's case. The general
obligations to do no harm, respect the vulnerability of the patient, and
treat each patient as a unique person are fulfilled in hospice care.
Specific ethical decisions about medical treatment are also made in
advance, so to speak, because such referral with patient or family
consent means that no further medical interventions will be
attempted, except perhaps, pain control surgery. Truth-telling problems are avoided. Hospice patients and their families know they are
dying.
Most of all, hospice care can lend some much-needed reality to the
obligation to provide for a "decent death" discussed in the first section. In normal hospital circumstances a "decent death" can still be
misconstrued as one filled with heroic measures and resuscitation
attempts. The family is often absent as hospital patients so treated die
in pieces, as it were, one organ system failing after another. If, indeed,
health care professionals do have an obligation to heal dying patients
by providing a decent or dignified death, then hospice referral is the
best current means to insure that that obligation is carried out.
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Conclusion
I have deliberately avoided a discussion of economic and pragmatic
ends in the care of dying patients, not to neglect their importance as
well, but to highlight the moral obligations attendant on health care
professionals and the health care system in treating dying patients.
Attention to the healing value of the doctor/patient relationship and
the patient's growing need for healing when health becomes impossible can provide the moral basis of special duties toward the dying.
While all of us share in these duties as a matter of justice and charity,
health care professionals have more intensive obligations toward the
dying based on their commitment to heal.
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